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Parens Patriae Actions on Behalf of Indirect
Purchasers: Do They Survive Illinois Brick?
In 1914, Congress enacted section 4 of the Clayton Act,' which
granted a private cause of action to any person injured in his business
or property by a violation of the antitrust laws. 2 Section 4 mandates
that a successful plaintiff shall recover treble damages and the cost of
suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.3
Section 4 was designed to insure enforcement of the antitrust laws.
There were two principal purposes behind the act: to deter violators by
depriving them of the benefits of their illegal acts, and to compensate
victims of antitrust violations for their injuries.4
By the 1970's, problems with private enforcement of antitrust vio-
lations were evident. Although the cost of antitrust violations to ulti-
mate consumers had been estimated to exceed 150 billion dollars per
year,5 each individual consumer was injured in relatively small
amounts and therefore had little incentive to sue.6 The stringent re-
quirements governing class action suits in federal courts made the class
action an ineffective device for antitrust violations.7 In California, the
state attorney general was thwarted in his attempt to sue on behalf of
consumers within the state for antitrust violations under section 4 of the
Clayton Act.8
Congress sought to remedy these problems by passing the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.9 Title III of the
1. Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). Section 4 provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any dis-
trict court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Beane, Passing-On Revived: An Antitrust Dilemma, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 347, 348
(1980).
5. A Bill To Restore Fair and Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on
S. 1874 Before the Subcomnm on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
6. S. REP. No. 94-803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
7. See infra notes 39-42 & accompanying text.
8. California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973). See infra notes 32-38 & accompanying text.
9. Pub. L. No. 94-435 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976)).
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Act 10 empowers state attorneys general to sue as parens patriael" on
behalf of citizens of their state in order to obtain monetary relief under
section 4 of the Clayton Act for Sherman Act violations. 12 The purpose
of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act was to create "an effective mechanism to
permit consumers to recover damages for conduct which is prohibited
by the Sherman Act, by giving State attorneys general a cause of action
against antitrust violators."' 3
Before the success of the Antitrust Improvements Act could be
tested, the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois'4
seemingly emasculated title III. The Court held that an indirect pur-
chaser' 5 injured by a violation of the-antitrust laws could not recover
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.' 6 Most courts have as-
sumed that the Illinois Brick decision restricts the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act by allowing the state attorney general to represent only direct pur-
chasers when suing as parens patriae for antitrust violations.' 7
This Comment begins by tracing the history of parens patriae ac-
tions leading up to the passage of the Antitrust Improvements Act. By
tracing briefly the history of parens patriae actions in this country, giv-
ing particular attention to antitrust actions, the legislative intent behind
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act can be discerned. The provisions of the Act
and policy considerations underlying the Act are analyzed as well. The
next section of the Comment explores the history of the Illinois Brick
decision and examines the scope of its holding. The last section exam-
ines the effect Illinois Brick has had on the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976.
This Comment concludes that the policy considerations underly-
ing Illinois Brick were recognized by Congress in its enactment of the
parens patriae action.' 8 Because the policy concerns which preoccu-
pied the Illinois Brick Court are dealt with in the Hart-Scott-Rodino
10. This Comment deals with only title III of the Antitrust Improvements Act. For a
discussion of title I (Antitrust Civil Process Act Amendments) and title II (requiring that
significant proposed acquisitions and mergers be reported to the Justice Department and to
the FTC), see Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 679 (1977).
11. See infra notes 20-26 & accompanying text.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976).
13. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 39.
14. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
15. An indirect purchaser is frequently the ultimate consumer in the chain of distribu-
tion. The Senate Report argued that the economic burden of most antitrust violations falls
upon the consumer who is charged higher prices for goods and services. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 6, at 39.
16. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 728-29.
17. See infra note 98.
18. See infra notes 112-29 & accompanying text.
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Act, parens patriae actions should be an exception to the Illinois Brick
rule.
This Comment also argues that the legislative history of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act, which so clearly evinced a desire to compensate the
ultimate consumer for injury caused by antitrust violations, is disposi-
tive in interpreting the provisions of the Act.' 9 Therefore, Illinois Brick
should not at all control parens patriae actions.
History of Parens Patriae
Parens patriae is a concept rooted in the English constitutional sys-
tem.20 The literal translation, "father of the country," refers to the
English system that empowered the king to act as guardian for persons
legally unable to act for themselves. 21 The people represented were
generally "infants, idiots and lunatics. ' 22 This form of parens patriae is
now served by the concept of guardian ad litem.2
In the United States the parens patriae role of the king passed to
the states, and the concept was greatly altered.24 It evolved into a
means by which a state could sue in its quasi-sovereign capacity. Early
cases involved one state suing another pursuant to article III, section 2
of the Constitution 25 on behalf of its citizens, alleging interference with
the flow of goods or natural resources into the state or acts of
pollution. 26
Parens Patriae Actions for Antitrust Violations
In Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad,27 the first Supreme Court de-
cision permitting a state to sue as parens patriae for violation of the
antitrust laws, the Court found that Georgia had parens patriae stand-
ing to sue for injunctive relief where injury to the state's general econ-
omy was alleged.28
19. See infra notes 53-54, 134-36 & accompanying text.
20. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
21. Id.
22. Note, Antitrust, Parens Patriae, Damages, and Automobile Emissions: Potentialy
Unfair Combination, 9 TRANSP. L.J. 189, 190 (1977) (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES 47).
23. Id.
24. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 257.
25. Id. at 258-59. The relevant portion of art. III, § 2 states that "[t]he judicial Power
shall extend to. . .Controversies between two or more States; [and] between a State and
Citizens of another State. . . ." U.S. CONsT. art III, § 2.
26. Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, The Hart-Scott-RodnoAntitrust Improvements Act of
1976. AnAnaolsis, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1977-78).
27. 324 U.S. 439 (1945). In Pennsylvania Railroad, the Court held that the state of
Georgia could seek injunctive relief against 20 railroads that allegedly conspired to set dis-
criminatory railroad freight rates.
28. Id. at 447.
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An attempt to extend the Pennsylvania Railroad holding to actions
for damages was rejected in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 29 Hawaii al-
leged that the defendants had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act
and sued for damages for injury to its general economy.30 The
Supreme Court held that Hawaii did not have standing because its alle-
gation of injury did not constitute injury to its "business or property" as
required by section 4 of the Clayton Act. 31 Although the decision in
Standard Oil Co. prohibited a state from recovering for injury to its
general economy, it left open the question whether a state could sue as
parens patriae to recover damages on behalf of its citizens.
This issue was raised in California v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 32 Frito-Lay
also was an attempt on the part of a state to bring a parens patriae
damages action to remedy an alleged violation of the Sherman Act.33
California brought suit, however, not on its own behalf but on behalf of
its citizens who were injured by the alleged illegal conduct of the
defendants. 34
The Ninth Circuit described the action as more typical of an ac-
tion by a guardian ad litem for the disabled members of the class it
represents than of a parens patriae suit.35 Although the court held that
California lacked standing to bring this parens patriae action on behalf
of its consumers, it encouraged Congress to overrule its decision. The
court viewed actions of the type attempted by California as essential to
the effective deterrence of antitrust violations. The court, however, felt
that the authorization for such actions "must come not through judicial
improvisation but by legislation and rule making .... *"36 Title III of
29. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
30. Id. at 253-56. Hawaii charged four defendants with violating § 1 of the Sherman
Act "by entering into unlawful contracts; by conspiring and combining to restrain trade and
commerce in the sale, marketing and distribution of refined petroleum products; and by
attempting to monopolize and actually monopolizing the trade and commerce." Id. at 253
(footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 264. The Court also noted the practical difficulties of placing a dollar value
on such an amorphous injury and further observed that to allow such an action to proceed
might well result in duplicative recovery against antitrust defendants. Id. at 263-64. The
latter concern was also at issue in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392
U.S. 481 (1968), and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
32. 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
33. In Frito-Lay, the state of California alleged that twelve manufacturers of snack
foods had conspired to fix and maintain prices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at
775.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 776. According to the Ninth Circuit, California was using the parens patriae
concept as it had been used historically in England. See supra notes 20-23 & accompanying
text.
36. 474 F.2d at 777. The persuasive language of the Ninth Circuit is worthy of quota-
tion: "The state most persuasively argues that it is essential that this sort of proceeding be
made available if antitrust violations of the sort here alleged are to be rendered unprofitable
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the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act is a direct re-
sponse37 to the invitation issued by the Ninth Circuit to Congress.38
Private Enforcement of the Sherman Act
Congress, by passing the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, attempted to al-
leviate the problems encountered in bringing class actions to enforce
antitrust violations.39 Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, large consumer classes predicated upon small individual claims
face insurmountable problems of manageability. These problems in-
clude the expense of "proper notice," the complexity of evidentiary is-
sues, and the distribution of any recovery. In Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin,40 the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 23 to require that
class action plaintiffs provide individual prelitigation notice to all iden-
tifiable members of the class regardless of the cost of providing such
notice.41 The Court's decision coupled with the existing problems
under Rule 23 made consumer class actions for antitrust violations vir-
tually impossible.42
Even though individual consumers are injured in relatively small
amounts by an antitrust violation, they ultimately bear the cost of the
and deterred. It would indeed appear that the state is on the track of a suitable answer
(perhaps the most suitable yet proposed) to problems bearing on antitrust deterrence and the
class action as a means of consumer protection. We disclaim any intent to discourage the
state in its search for a solution.
"However, if the state is to be empowered to act in the fashion here sought we feel the
authority must come not through judicial improvisation but by legislation and rule making,
where careful consideration can be given to the conditions and procedures that will suffice to
meet the many problems posed by one's assertion of power to deal with another's property
and to commit him to actions taken in his behalf." Id.
37. H.R. RP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as House
REPORT]. The House Report on H.R. 4532 (the bill that became Pub. L. No. 94-435) stated,
"H.R. 4532 is a response to the judicial invitation extended in Frito-Lay. The thrust of the
bill is to overturn Frito-Lay by allowing state attorneys general to act as consumer advocates
in the enforcement process. . . ." Id.
38. Frito-Lay, 474 F.2d at 777.
39. House Report, supra note 37, at 6-7.
40. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
41. Id. at 175-76.
42. Although stringent proof of injury is required under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, class action suits are still used to enforce the antitrust laws, as demon-
strated by the case of Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). InReiter, the petitioner
brought a class action on behalf of herself and all persons in the United States who had
purchased hearing aids manufactured by the five respondent corporations. The complaint
alleged that petitioner and the class she represented were forced to pay illegally fixed higher
prices for their hearing aids and related services. Id. at 335. The Supreme Court held that
consumers who pay a higher price for goods purchased for personal use as a result of anti-
trust violations sustain an injury in their property within the meaning of section 4 of the
Clayton Act. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, which had granted
respondents' summary judgment motion, and remanded the case. Id. at 334-37.
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violation through higher prices. 43 Such relatively small injuries to an
individual consumer may still add up to a huge profit margin for an
antitrust violator. An antitrust violation resulting in an overcharge of
only ten cents on a consumer item brings a staggering fifty million dol-
lars in illegal profits, if 500 million such items are sold.44 Yet, individ-
ual section 4 damage actions are unrealistic because the anticipated
time and expense needed to establish antitrust liability often exceeds
anly prospective recovery.45 Thus, the decisions in Frito-Lay and Eisen
and the impracticality of an individual consumer's bringing a Clayton
section 4 action left the consumer with no effective means by which to
enforce the Sherman Act. It was this deficiency that Congress sought to
remedy with the passage of title III of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act was designed to fill a procedural vac-
uum in the antitrust laws and redress violations which continually in-
jure thousands or even millions of consumers.46 The legislation was
directed particularly to everyday consumer purchasers.47 Its purposes
were "to compensate the victims of antitrust offenses, to prevent anti-
trust violators from being unjustly enriched, and to deter future anti-
trust violations." 48
The heart of the Act provides:
Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name
of such State, as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing
in such State, in any district court of the United States having juris-
diction of the defendant, to secure monetary relief as provided in this
section for injury sustained by such natural persons to their property
by reason of any violation of [the Sherman Act].4 9
Congress chose the state attorney general as a "stand-in" to manage the
litigation for the individuals who could not afford to pursue their Sher-
man Act rights. Congress gave two reasons for granting standing to the
attorneys general: the states bear an obligation to protect their citizens,
and the states possess a quasi-sovereign interest in safeguarding the
health of their economies.50 Thus, even though the states allege no in-
43. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 3-4; SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 39.
44. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 39-40.
45. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 4-5.
46. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 39.
47. Id.
48. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 3.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976).
50. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 5; SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 40. The
concept of parens patriae as Congress here employs it combines both types of parens patriae
actions: that which was used in England and was replaced by the guardian ad litem in the
United States, and the expanded concept of parens patriae that evolved in the United States.
See supra notes 20-26 & accompanying text.
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jury to themselves, they can establish standing as representatives of
their residents who in fact have been injured and could have brought
suit in their own right.5 '
The action is brought "on behalf of natural persons residing in
such State."52 Title III does not specifically dictate that the natural per-
son be a direct or an indirect purchaser. However, the legislative his-
tory of the bill indicates that it was intended to facilitate the assertion
of section 4 rights, which Congress believed to include those of indirect
purchasers.5 3 Representative Rodino, one of the bill's sponsors, ex-
pressed this intention in his remarks on the House floor:
[R]ecoveries are authorized by the compromise bill whether or not
the consumers purchased directly from the price fixer, or indirectly,
from intermediaries, retailers, or middlemen. The technical and pro-
cedural argument that consumers have no "standing" whenever they
are not "in privity" with the price fixer, and have not purchased di-
rectly from him, is rejected by the compromise bill.54
The parens patriae act includes a provision for individual plaintiffs
who wish to opt out of the action by the state.5 5 The final judgment in a
parens patriae action is res judicata as to those who fail to opt out in a
timely fashion. 56 Congress by this provision anticipated the Court's
concern with the possibility of double recovery in antitrust actions.5 7
The "opt out" provision also cloaks the state attorney general's
action with consumer approval. Because the state speaks only for those
consumers who decline to opt out of the suit, a court can be confident
that representation by the state attorney general is both acquiesced in
and necessary for the enforcement of the consumers' Sherman Act
rights.
The problem of notice requirements under Rule 23 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, which hampered consumer class action suits for anti-
trust violations,58 was dealt with directly in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
Section (b)(1) of the Act allows notice to be given by publication. "If
51. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,
1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,839, at 73,496 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976). The limitation to "natural persons" does not exist in
§ 4 of the Clayton Act, which applies to "any person." See supra note 1. Thus, with parens
patriae actions the state attorney general may represent only natural persons and not busi-
ness entities. Congress felt that business entities, such as corporations, partnerships, and sole
proprietorships, were capable of protecting themselves. By limiting the parens patriae provi-
sion to "natural persons," Congress intended that actions be brought on behalf of those most
in need of representation. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 9-10.
53. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 7-8; SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 40-41.
54. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 757 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing 122 CONG. REC. H10295 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1976)).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(2) (1976).
56. Id. § 15c(b)(3).
57. See infra note 82 & accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 39-42 & accompanying text.
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the court finds that notice given solely by publication would deny due
process of law to any person. . . ,the court may direct further notice
to such person . . . according to the circumstances of the case."5 9
The stringent "proof of injury" requirement under Rule 23 in con-
sumer class actions60 also was eliminated under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act. Congress provided for the calculation of monetary relief in price-
fixing cases using aggregate techniques to compute damages.61 Utiliz-
ing these techniques, a state attorney general does not have to prove the
actual damages suffered by each individual but needs only to make a
reasonable estimate of his or her aggregate damages through the use of
statistical or sampling methods.62 The legislative history makes it clear
that more than mere speculation is required in computing the amount
of aggregate damages. 63 The aggregate damages technique is applied
only to price-fixing cases; traditional methods of proving actual indi-
vidual damages must be used for other Sherman Act violations. 64
The aggregate damages provisions of section 15d ensure that anti-
trust violators will not be unjustly enriched.65 They also make it possi-
ble for a state attorney general to represent thousands, or even millions,
of consumers in a single lawsuit, thus eliminating the need for countless
suits in which consumers would have to prove their claims and dam-
ages individually.66 However, the Act also "recognizes that rarely, if
ever, will all potential claimants actually come forward to secure their
share of the recovery" and that "the undistributed portion of the fund
. . . will often be substantial .... ,,67 Therefore, if these individual
consumers fail to exhaust the fund, the remainder may be considered a
civil penalty and ordered deposited with the state as general revenues68
or distributed for other appropriate purposes.69 Thus, the unclaimed
damages may be used as a fluid recovery "for some public purposes
59. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (1976).
60. See supra note 42.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 15d (1976).
62. Id.
63. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 15. For example, if an attorney general proved
that a group of bakers had conspired to raise the price of bread two cents per loaf, he could
estimate damages by multiplying that amount by the number of loaves sold to consumers in
the state, or determine damages using records kept by the defendants or other entities in the
chain of distribution. Kintner, Griffin & Goldston, supra note 26, at 25-26.
64. Thus, in cases involving violations other than price-fixing, the consumers must have
records, receipts, or other supporting indications of their purchases in order to prove injury.
65. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 14.
66. Id. at 15. Once the total amount of the overcharge has been computed and assessed
against the defendants, their real interest in the case is at an end. The issue of how the
assessed damages should be distributed under 15 U.S.C. § 15e is determined without any
participation by the defendant. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 48.
67. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 16.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 15e(2) (1976).
69. Id. § 15e(l).
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benefitting, as closely as possible, the class of injured persons. 70
By enacting the aggregate damages and fluid recovery provisions,
Congress attempted to ensure the effectiveness of the private treble-
damages action as an instrument of antitrust enforcement. The viabil-
ity of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act was seem-
ingly undermined, however, by the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois.71 Before discussing whether Congress succeeded
in its attempt to ensure antitrust enforcement, this Comment will trace
the history of the Illinois Brick decision and examine the scope of its
holding.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois
The Court in Illinois Brick held that an indirect purchaser from a
person who violates the antitrust laws may not recover damages under
section 4 of the Clayton Act. To understand the policy considerations
that form the basis of the Court's decision, it is necessary first to con-
sider an earlier Supreme Court case, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp. 72 In Hanover Shoe, the plaintiff, a shoe manufac-
turer, sued the defendant shoe machinery manufacturer, claiming that
United's practice of leasing rather than selling its machinery had mo-
nopolized the shoe machinery industry in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. The plaintiff alleged injury to his business resulting
from the leasing practice, because his costs were higher than they
would have been if United had been willing to sell the machinery
outright.73
The defendant asserted the defense of "passing-on," 74 alleging that
the plaintiff was not injured by the overcharge because it was passed on
to its customers further down the chain of distribution in the form of
higher prices. The Supreme Court soundly rejected this defense and
held that "when a buyer shows that the price paid by him for materials
purchased for use in his business is illegally high and also shows the
amount of the overcharge, he has made out a prima facie case of injury
and damage within the meaning of § 4."75
70. House REPORT, supra note 37, at 16. The Senate Report cited, as an example,
cases in which recoveries for illegal overcharges on bus and taxi fares were applied to reduce
those fares in future years. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 49 (citing Bebchick v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); Daar v. Yellow
Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1967)).
71. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
72. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
73. Id. at 483-84.
74. The doctrine of passing-on refers to the process in which a firm in the distributive
chain that has been overcharged adjusts its prices to reflect that overcharge. In re Beef
Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1153 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979).
75. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 489.
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The Hanover Shoe Court advanced two policy considerations as
bases for its holding. First, the Court was concerned with the "insur-
mountable" difficulties of proof in tracing the impact of an overcharge
through the chain of distribution. Because of the subjective nature of
pricing policies and the fluctuation of consumer demand, it would be
nearly impossible to determine whether a plaintiff would have raised its
prices even without the overcharge.76 Second, the Court believed that
deterrence of antitrust violations could best be achieved by vesting the
power to sue in the direct purchaser. The Court reasoned that indirect
purchasers suffer relatively insignificant monetary injury compared to
the direct purchaser and hence have less incentive to litigate. In the
Hanover Shoe situation, the indirect purchaser, the buyer of a pair of
shoes, would have so little at stake that he or she would have little
interest in attempting a class action.77 If direct purchasers were not
allowed to sue for the portion of the overcharge passed on to indirect
purchasers, antitrust violators would profit by their illegal acts because
no one would bring suit against them.78
Although Hanover Shoe prohibited the defensive use of the pass-
ing-on doctrine, it left unanswered the question whether indirect pur-
chasers could use the passing-on theory offensively against remote
sellers. This question was answered in the negative in Illinois Brick v.
Illinois. 79
The plaintiffs in Illinois Brick were the State of Illinois and 700
local governmental entities that brought suit against the defendant con-
crete block manufacturers, charging them with price-fixing in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. These manufacturers allegedly fixed
the price of concrete blocks that they sold to masonry contractors. The
masonry contractors, acting as subcontractors for the masonry portions
of construction projects, in turn sold to general contractors. The gen-
eral contractors sold the buildings to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were
thus at least two steps removed from the defendants in the chain of
distribution. The complaint alleged that the amount the plaintiffs paid
for concrete block was more than three million dollars higher because
of the defendants' price-fixing conspiracy. Money damages were
sought in an amount equal to the overcharge exacted by the manufac-
turers and passed on by their customers to the indirect purchasers.80
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick based its decision rejecting
offensive use of the pass-on theory on policy considerations. The
Court, seeking symmetry with its earlier holding in Hanover Shoe,
76. Id. at 492-93.
77. Id. at 494.
78. Id.
79. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
80. Id. at 726-27.
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stated that "whatever rule is to be adopted regarding pass-on in anti-
trust damages actions, it must apply equally to plaintiffs and defend-
ants." 81 Thus, if a defendant manufacturer or supplier is not permitted
to employ a passing-on defense under Hanover Shoe, an indirect pur-
chaser plaintiff should not be allowed to recover passed-on damages
from that same constrained manufacturer or supplier.
The Court gave two reasons for its decision requiring symmetry.
First, allowing offensive but not defensive use of passing-on would cre-
ate a substantial risk of multiple liability for defendants. 82 The second
reason for the symmetrical approach related to the complications of
proving damages that had been articulated in Hanover Shoe. 83 The
Court feared that allowing the offensive use of the pass-on theory
would create enormous evidentiary uncertainties that would add
"whole new dimensions of complexity to treble-damages suits." 84
Of the two policy reasons given for the symmetrical approach, the
Court considered the tracing-of-damages argument the more signifi-
cant. The Court acknowledged that the risk of multiple liability could
be alleviated by bringing all potential plaintiffs, whether direct or indi-
rect purchasers, into one action. However, it still maintained that indi-
rect purchasers should not be permitted to sue under section 4, arguing
that if all potential plaintiffs were brought together in one huge action,
the treble-damage proceedings would become too complex.8 5
The Supreme Court also advanced the deterrence rationale given
in Hanover Shoe86 as a basis for its holding. Permitting use of the pass-
on theory would give both direct and indirect purchasers inadequate
incentive to sue since neither could recover the full amount of the over-
charge. The Court believed that the policy of encouraging vigorous
private enforcement of the antitrust laws would be best supported if the
81. Id. at 728.
82. Id. at 730. This contention can be easily illustrated by the Illinois Brick facts. The
cement block manufacturers would be prevented from raising the defense of pass-on by
Hanover Shoe in a suit brought by the masonry contractors. Therefore, the contractors
could recover all of the proven overcharge from the manufacturers. If the ultimate building
purchaser also were allowed to sue the manufacturer for the passed-on overcharge, the man-
ufacturer could be held liable in two treble-damage actions, paying six times the actual
damage. See Beane, supra note 4, at 353. Even the Illinois Brick Court, however, acknowl-
edged that this risk could be avoided through the use of various procedural devices bringing
all potential plaintiffs together in one action. See infra note 85 & accompanying text.
83. See supra note 76 & accompanying text.
84. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 737. The Court stated: "The evidentiary complexities
and uncertainties involved in the defensive use of pass-on against a direct purchaser are
multiplied in the offensive use of pass-on by a plaintiff several steps removed from the de-
fendant in the chain of distribution. The demonstration of how much of the overcharge was
passed on by the first purchaser must be repeated at each point at which the price-fixed
goods changed hands before they reached the plaintiff." Id at 732-33.
85. Id at 731 n.ll.
86. See supra notes 77-78 & accompanying text.
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direct purchasers were spared the burdens and complexities of litigat-
ing the pass-on defense but still were allowed to recover the full
amount of the overcharge.8 7
The rule denying indirect purchasers the right to bring a treble-
damages action was not totally inflexible. Where the underlying policy
considerations do not exist, there is no reason to apply the rule. The
Supreme Court in Illinois Brick acknowledged that the reasons for its
holding would not apply when an overcharged buyer had a pre-existing
"cost-plus" contract with the direct purchaser.8 This was the only ex-
ception recognized by the Court in Hanover Shoe.89 The complexities
of determining damages in an offensive pass-on situation are not in-
volved, because the purchaser is committed to buying a fixed quantity
regardless of price. Because the effect of the overcharge essentially is
determined in advance, the problem of proving damages that compli-
cates the determination in the usual case would not be present. 90 In a
footnote to this discussion, the Court suggested a second exception,
which permits the pass-on defense "where the direct purchaser is
owned or controlled by its customer." 91 The exceptions to the rule bar-
ring indirect purchasers from bringing damage actions for antitrust vio-
lations that have been recognized by the Supreme Court strongly
suggest that where the policy concerns are met, there is no reason to
apply the rule.92
It is significant that the Illinois Brick holding is grounded on pol-
icy considerations. The case simply defines which injury the law will
recognize in order for a person to bring suit under the Clayton Act.
There are no constitutional implications in the holding. Indeed, the
Court states:
Because we find Hanover Shoe dispositive here, we do not address
the [constitutional] standing issue, except to note ... that the ques-
tion of which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for
purposes of § 4 is analytically distinct from the question of which
persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them standing to
87. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745-46.
88. Id. at 736. With a cost-plus contract the indirect purchaser contracts with the direct
purchaser for a fixed quantity of goods to be priced at cost plus a specific markup.
89. 392 U.S. at 494.
90. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.
91. Id. at 736 n.16. This second exception has been expanded by the courts since Illi-
nois Brick. The exception now applies in two situations. The first is where the direct pur-
chaser is owned or controlled by its customer, and the second is where it is owned or
controlled by its supplier. The second situation has been labelled the "co-conspirator" ex-
ception. See, e.g., Jewish Hosp. Ass'n v. Stewart Mechanical Enter., 628 F.2d 971 (6th Cir.
1980); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148, 1160 (5th Cir. 1979); Gas-A-
Tron v. American Oil Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,789, at 73,245 (D. Ariz. 1977).
92. See infra note 112 & accompanying text.
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sue for damages under § 4.93
Because the results in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick have been dic-
tated by policy considerations, where those policy concerns are not
present, offensive use of the passing-on theory should not be
prohibited.
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act After
Illinois Brick
Response to Illinois Brick
There was an immediate and widespread reaction to the Illinois
Brick decision. Justice Brennan expressed the feelings of the support-
ers of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act when he wrote in dissent, "Today's
decision flouts Congress' purpose and severely undermines the effec-
tiveness of the private treble-damages action as an instrument of anti-
trust enforcement: ' 94 The Association of State Attorneys General,
most of whom had filed as amici curiae in support of the losing side in
Illinois Brick, assumed that the decision crippled the parens patriae
provision in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.95
Congressional reaction to the Court's decision was immediate al-
though ineffective. Five days after the decision, legislation was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives to overrule the result.96 One
month later Senator Kennedy and Representative Rodino introduced
identical bills to amend section 4 of the Clayton Act and overrule Illi-
nois Brick.97
Congress and the Association of State Attorneys General both
made it clear by their remarks and responses that they believed the
Illinois Brick holding affected Title III of the Antitrust Improvements
Act. This belief appears to be shared by the courts. 98
93. 431 U.S. at 728 n.7.
94. Id. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Sneeden, Illinois Brick-Do We Look to the Courts or Congress? 24 ANTITRUST
BULL. 205, 206 (1979).
96. Beane, supra note 4, at 362.
97. Id. To date none of these bills has passed either in the House or in the Senate, and
with the more conservative bent in Congress, it appears highly unlikely that Illinois Brick
will be overruled legislatively.
98. See infra notes 99-111 & accompanying text. See also Lohse v. Dairy Commission,
1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,805, at 73,337 (D. Nev. 1977). Legal scholars also seem to
share this view. See, e.g., Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 309,
325 n. 74 (1977); Note, Congressional Authorization of Indirect Purchaser Treble Damage
Claims, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 1025, 1035 (1979); Note, Illinois Brick: An Abuse o/Precedent
to Circumvent Congressional Intent, 1977 UTAH L. Rnv. 501, 517. But see Kintner, Griffin &
Goldston, supra note 26, at 22-23; Scher, Emerging Issues Under the Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 679, 726-27 (1977).
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In Vermont v. Densmore Brick Co., Inc. ,99 the Vermont state attor-
ney general brought suit as parens patriae on behalf of all Vermont
residents who purchased Jotul brand woodburning stoves from defend-
ant's Vermont retailers on or after September 30, 1976 (the date the
Antitrust Improvements Act became effective). The plaintiff sought
treble damages and injunctive relief arising from defendant's alleged
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Vermont alleged that Den-
smore fixed prices at which Jotul stoves were advertised and offered for
retail sale, that it coerced its Vermont retailers to advertise and sell the
stoves at its established or suggested retail prices and that Densmore
terminated a Vermont retailer who did not comply or who was sus-
pected of not complying with the price restrictions. Defendant Dens-
more moved for summary judgment, arguing that the state represented
indirect purchasers and therefore had no cause of action under Illinois
Brick. 00
The district court, while denying the motion for summary judg-
ment, assumed that Illinois Brick prevented the state from suing on
behalf of indirect purchasers.101 The court asserted, however, that the
restriction imposed in Illinois Brick applies only where a plaintiff in a
price-fixing conspiracy is removed from the conspiracy by one or more
stages of distribution.10 2 The court reasoned that under Illinois Brick,
if plaintiff's purchases were made directly from the alleged price-fixing
conspiracy between Densmore and its Vermont Jotul dealers, the plain-
tiff would have the right to sue. Because the plaintiff alleged from the
outset that it had made direct purchases, Illinois Brick did not mandate
summary disposition. 10 3
Essentially, the district court in Densmore Brick believed that the
state attorney general must represent either direct purchasers or pur-
chasers who fit a recognized exception to Illinois Brick' 04 in order to
bring suit for antitrust violations. Thus, the court sought an exception
that avoided the policy considerations articulated by the Supreme
Court in Illinois Brick.
This sentiment was echoed in In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceed-
ings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation. 105 Various states
brought actions against several major oil companies, alleging violations
of federal and state antitrust laws. The cases were consolidated for pre-
trial proceedings. The defendants moved to dismiss, claiming, inter
alia, that the plaintiff states represented indirect purchasers and were
99. 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,347 (D. Vt. 1980).
100. Id. at 75,776-78.
101. Id. at 75,778.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 88-92 & accompanying text.
105. 497 F. Supp. 218 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
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barred by Illinois Brick from bringing suit. The court, using the same
approach as that employed by the district court in Densmore Brick,
held that:
with respect to the plaintiffs' claims that the defendants conspired to
fix prices either at the wholesale or retail level, the plaintiffs will be
allowed to seek recovery only as to direct purchases from a defend-
ant, a co-conspirator, sellers with whom the plaintiffs had pre-ex-
isting, fixed-quantity, cost-plus contracts, or an entity controlled by a
conspirator.1 6
The court in Petroleum Products, as in -Densmore Brick, was willing to
allow exceptions meeting the policy concerns of Illinois Brick.
A third federal district court took an even more sympathetic stance
toward parens patriae actions, though it refused to hold outwardly that
a state attorney general can sue on behalf of indirect purchasers. In In
re Mid-Atlanta Toyota Antitrust Litigation,10 7 a lawsuit consolidating
four parens patriae actions, the plaintiffs sought treble damages on be-
half of state residents who purchased Toyota automobiles bearing a
protective finish called polyglycoat. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants
conspired to fix an artificially high price for this polyglycoat finish in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Defendants. moved to dis-
miss the parens patriae actions seeking monetary relief on the ground
that they were brought by or on behalf of indirect purchasers barred
from financial recovery under Illinois Brick.10 8
The Toyota court held that, in order to bring suit, the plaintiff
states must fit into an exception to Illinois Brick. The court stated that
it would be inappropriate to apply a rule when the reasons for applying
it do not exist.' 09 Therefore, if the principal policy considerations un-
derlying Illinois Brick are not present, an indirect purchaser should be
able to bring a treble-damages action.
The court allowed plaintiffs to prove the existence of a voluntary
conspiracy between the regional Toyota distributor and the various
Toyota dealers in order to remove from themselves the stigma of "indi-
rect purchasers." However, the court made it clear that the states would
not be able to sue on behalf of their indirect purchasers unless the in-
volvement of the direct purchasers in the conspiracy was proved. 1 0
Because the court believed the plaintiffs would have difficulty proving
the conspiracy, it denied the defendants' motion to dismiss with leave
for them to renew the motion later in the proceedings."'
106. Id. at 227.
107. 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981).
108. Id. at 1289.
109. Id. at 1293.
110. Id. at 1296-97.
1. Id. at 1296. The court stated: "mhe plaintiffs have a long and tortuous road
ahead in seeking to prove the existence of the voluntary conspiracy which they allege. The
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The courts' refusal to allow parens patriae actions on behalf of
indirect purchasers under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act stems from their
interpretation of Illinois Brick. The courts continue to require that the
state attorneys general find an exception to Illinois Brick in order to
bring parens patriae actions for state residents who are indirect
purchasers.
The Effect of Illinois Brick on the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976
The courts have seemingly overlooked the fact that the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act addresses the policy considerations discussed in Illinois
Brick and thus should qualify as an exception to that decision. As the
district court of Maryland stated in the Toyota litigation, "Take away
the principal policy consideration, the foundation so to speak, underly-
ing Illinois Brick, and the reasons for applying the rule disappear. And
when the reasons for the rule do not apply, application of the rule
would be plainly inappropriate."'" 2 The major policy considerations
underlying Illinois Brick were risk of duplicative recovery, 13 tracing-
of-damages difficulties,' 4 and deterrence." 5 The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act dealt with each of these considerations.
First, the Act deals directly with the risk of multiple liability.
Because the state attorney general brings the action on behalf of all
state residents injured by the antitrust violation, direct and indirect
purchasers may be joined in one suit. 16 The Act contains an "opt out"
provision, and the final judgment will be res judicata as to those who
fail to opt out in a timely fashion as the Act provides.' 17 The Illinois
Court further recognizes that discovery, once completed, might reveal that the distributor
and dealers did not combine or conspire in restraint of trade. For these reasons, the Court
will permit any or all of the defendants to renew their Illinois Brick Motions at a later time
when the Court will be presented with additional facts from which an informed judgment
can be made." Id at 1296-97.
112. Id at 1293.
113. See supra note 82 & accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 83-85 & accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 86-87 & accompanying text.
116. Some risk of double recovery will still remain because the state attorney general
can only represent natural persons. See supra note 52 & accompanying text. If the direct
purchasers are corporations or small businesses, they will not be joined in the parens patriae
action. This remaining risk of double recovery may be unacceptable in light of the concerns
of the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick. Congress, however, viewed deterrence as its overrid-
ing concern. See infra note 144 & accompanying text. Perhaps some overlap is inevitable if
deterrence is to be achieved.
It is important to reiterate that Illinois Brick was based on policy considerations and not
on constitutional grounds. See supra note 43 & accompanying text. Because it is the func-
tion of Congress to formulate policy in this country, its views should take precedence over
those of the Supreme Court.
117. See supra notes 55-57 & accompanying text.
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Brick Court itself acknowledged that the risk of multiple liability
would be alleviated if all potential plaintiffs were brought together in
one action. However, because of the primacy given the tracing-of-
damages consideration, the Court essentially stated that reducing the
risk of multiple liability alone would not warrant abandoning the Han-
over Shoe rule.'" 8
Second, and more importantly as far as the Supreme Court was
concerned,119 the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act con-
tains a provision that deals specifically with calculation of monetary
relief in price-fixing cases. 120 The provision allows for damages to be
proved and assessed in the aggregate by statistical or sampling meth-
ods, by the computation of illegal overcharges, or by some other rea-
sonable system of estimating aggregate damages. The relief recovered
in a title III suit is initially offered to those on whose behalf the suit was
brought. Because it is expected that these consumers will fail to ex-
haust the fund, the remainder may be considered a civil penalty and
ordered deposited with the state as general revenues or distributed for
other appropriate purposes.' 2 '
Thus, direct purchasers could step forward and collect their share
of a parens patriae recovery first. Obviously, fewer proof-of-damages
difficulties exist with a direct purchaser, so that initially a title III suit
would meet Illinois Brick requirements. The relief, calculated in the
aggregate and collected on behalf of indirect purchasers, may be depos-
ited with the state or used to benefit the indirect purchasers who suf-
fered injury.' 22 In this way, both the spirit of Illinois Brick and the
provisions of the Act will be complied with. By using the aggregate
damages techniques provided for in the Act, some of the tracing-of-
damages problems noted by the Supreme Court will be avoided.
Defendants in pending cases have attacked the aggregate damages
provisions of title III as being unconstitutional. The defendants allege
that these provisions violate the due process clause, 23 the just compen-
sation clause of the fifth amendment, and the appointments clause. 124
The courts to date have found it too early in the litigation process to
address these issues. They have recognized, however, that a constitu-
118. See supra note 85 & accompanying text.
119. See id
120. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(2) (1976).
121. See supra notes 61-70 & accompanying text.
122. Congress anticipated that indirect and direct purchasers would pose different
problems in calculating damages and that, therefore, each group must be dealt with sepa-
rately in determining questions of causation and fact of injury. HousE REPORT, supra note
37, at 14.
123. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,
1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,839, at 73496-97 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
124. In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1285-86 (D. Md.
1981).
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tional problem may exist.' 25 The House Committee on the Judiciary
also considered the possible constitutional defenses the Act's damages
provisions would encounter and "squarely rejected arguments that this
method of applying damage recoveries to the general benefit of the in-
jured class is unconstitutional."'' 26 The committee firmly believed that
"[o]nce it is acknowledged that the antitrust violator has no constitu-
tional right to retain the profits of his illegal activity, it becomes clear
that he has no constitutionally protected interest in how those profits
are distributed for the benefit of those whom he has injured."' 27
Third, the Court in Illinois Brick believed that deterrence of Sher-
man Act violations could best be achieved by giving only the direct
purchaser the right to sue.' 28 The parens patriae legislation also pro-
motes deterrence because it does not deprive the direct purchaser of his
or her suit. Thus, under parens patriae, direct purchasers who are nat-
ural persons and could have brought a suit in their own right will be
represented. However, another entire class of plaintiffs will also be rep-
resented: the indirect purchasers. Therefore, deterrence, one of the
primary purposes of section 4 private treble-damage actions, will be
strengthened under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.
Because the Act deals directly with the problems of possible dupli-
cative recovery and tracing-of-damages and serves further to deter anti-
trust violators, it embodies the policy considerations that concerned the
Supreme Court in Illinois Brick. Therefore, there is no need to apply
the rule laid down by Illinois Brick that bars damage actions by indi-
rect purchasers. The Supreme Court itself in its decision has recog-
nized that its rule will not always be necessary and has enumerated
exceptions.' 29 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is analogous to those excep-
125. Toyota, 525 F. Supp. at 1286; Petroleum Products, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at
73,497. The courts have soundly rejected other constitutional attacks: (1) that the State has
no standing to bring a parens patriae action, see e.g., New Mexico v. Scott & Fetzer Co.,
1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,439 (D. N.M. 1981); In re Montgomery County Real Estate
Antitrust Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 54 (D. Md. 1978); (2) that the grant of authority to the
state attorney general violates the tenth amendment, see, e.g., New Mexico v. Scott & Fetzer
Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,439 (D. N.M. 1981); and (3) that the statute violates
article II because the granting of standing is an appointment of a federal officer, see, e.g., id.
126. House REPORT, supra note 37, at 16. The fluid recovery device, which is also used
under California's antitrust law, the Cartwright Act, recently sustained a challenge. In
Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1981), the California
Court of Appeal held that a fluid recovery could be used to distribute damages in a Cart-
wright Act suit. The court disagreed with the contention that fluid recovery causes a denial
of due process of law, reasoning that "[a] class action which affords due process of law to the
defendant through the time when the amount of his liability is calculated cannot suddenly
deprive him of his constitutional rights because of the way the damages are distributed." Id.
at 128-29, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
127. House REPORT, supra note 37, at 16.
128. See supra note 87 & accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 88-93 & accompanying text.
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tions, and courts should feel free to allow state attorneys general to
represent all natural persons in their states when bringing damage ac-
tions for Sherman Act violations.
It may not be necessary to bring the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act within
the framework of Illinois Brick because the Supreme Court may never
have intended that Illinois Brick be used to bar indirect purchaser suits
brought by the state attorneys general. The Court did not ignore the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in deciding Illinois Brick. Instead, it simply did
not find the legislative intent, so clearly articulated by supporters of
title III, to be dispositive of the issue whether the offensive use of the
"passing-on" doctrine should be permitted in Illinois Brick. The Court
recognized that Representative Rodino clearly assumed that the
Supreme Court would allow the use of offensive pass-on under section
4.130 However, the Court pointed out that the parens patriae legislation
"did not alter the definition of which overcharged persons were injured
within the meaning of § 4. It simply created a new procedural device
.. . to enforce existing fights of recovery under § 4."131 The Court
quoted the House Report, stating that the parens patriae provision
"creates no new substantive liability."' 32
Because the Court felt that the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act did not cre-
ate a new fight of recovery for consumers, it then rejected the parens
patfiae legislation as not "dispositive as to the interpretation of § 4 of
the Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, or the predecessor section of the
Sherman Act, enacted in 1890."' 33
A cursory reading of this statement by the Supreme Court could
lead to the conclusion that the Court did not believe that state attorneys
general are authorized to sue on behalf of indirect purchasers, i.e., on
behalf of those who allege offensive pass-on to prove injury within the
meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act.134 Yet, is that what the Court
really said? The Court firmly determined that the legislative history of
the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 did not govern interpretation
of section 4 of the Clayton Act. The legislative history of the Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, however, may govern the interpretation of
its own provisions. Furthermore, Congress made it clear that the Act
was intended to give everyday consumers a remedy against antitrust
violations. As Justice Brennan declared in his dissent, "It is difficult to
see how Congress could have expressed itself more clearly."' 35 If the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act's legislative history governs the interpretation
130. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 733-34 n.14.
131. Id. at 734 n.14.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. This apparently was the conclusion reached by the courts in Densmore Brick, Petro-
leum Products, and Toyota. See supra notes 99-111 & accompanying text.
135. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of the Act's own provisions, then a state attorney general should be
able to bring suit for antitrust violations on behalf of residents in his or
her state regardless of whether the resident is a direct or an indirect
purchaser. 136
The Supreme Court's interpretation of who is "injured" within the
meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act should not apply equally to
parens patriae actions and to actions brought by the purchasers them-
selves, because there are differences between the two actions. First, in
parens patriae actions the state attorney general may represent only
"natural persons" and not corporations or small businesses. 37 Second,
these natural persons must be injured in their "property."'' 38 The Clay-
ton Act's section 4 injury can be in either the "business or property" of
"any person."
Conclusion
Although most courts have assumed that a state attorney general is
barred by Illinois Brick from bringing a parens patriae action on behalf
of indirect purchasers, 39 a careful scrutiny of Illinois Brick indicates
that this may not be true.
First, some district courts have interpreted Illinois Brick as apply-
ing only when the policy considerations that underlay the holding are
present.14° In enacting the parens patriae legislation, Congress was
concerned with the same policy considerations that motivated the
Supreme Court in Illinois Brick. It enacted specific provisions to ad-
dress the problems of duplicative recovery 14' and proof-of-damages
difficulties. 142 The House Committee on the Judiciary believed that its
aggregate damages provision would serve a dual purpose: manageabil-
ity of large consumer classes and deterrence. 143 Congress strongly ar-
ticulated its concern that antitrust violators be deterred in stating:
The antitrust laws should, at a minimum, provide an effective means
whereby a plaintiff class can force a guilty defendant to part with all
measurable fruits of his illegal activity. . . multiplied three-fold to
136. Under this reasoning indirect purchasers suing individually will still be barred by
Illinois Brick, but as congressional studies have indicated, few indirect purchasers have
enough at stake in a lawsuit to sue for antitrust violations. See supra notes 43-45 & accom-
panying text.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (1976).
138. The Supreme Court has held that consumers who pay a higher price for goods
purchased for personal use because of an antitrust violation have sustained an injury in their
"property." Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 334-35 (1979). See supra note 42. This type
of injury is more likely to affect an indirect purchaser than a direct purchaser.
139. See supra note 98.
140. See supra note 112 & accompanying text.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(l) (1976).
142. Id. § 15d.
143. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 37, at 13-14.
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reflect the factor Congress has determined is necessary as a punish-
ment, as a deterrent, and as an incentive.44
Second, the Court held only that the legislative history of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act would not be dispositive as to the proper interpreta-
tion of section 4 of the Clayton Act. This, however, does not prevent
the legislative intent of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act from being disposi-
tive as to the interpretation of its own provisions. 45
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
strongly and effectively anticipated the Supreme Court's policy con-
cerns. The courts thus can satisfy the policy considerations of the
Supreme Court and implement congressional policy by recognizing the
viability of the parens patriae legislation as an exception to Illinois
Brick and according the state attorney general the right to sue for anti-




145. See supra notes 133-36 & accompanying text.
* Member, Third Year Class.
September 1982]

